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The educational philosophers who wrote in The Social Frontier dealt unabash-
edly with problems arising out of the social conflicts of their time. Their universe 
of discourse opened outward to the turbulent domains of politics, economics, 
and the ideational changes occurring all·around. Fundamental to their concern 
was the question of liberty in its relation to equality and social control. Rejecting 
18th century atomistic notions, persistent dualisms, and the association of liberal-
ism with laissez-faire ideas, they sought a view that “combined equality and liberty 
as coordinate ideals . . .”1 Because this placed them in a position of opposition to 
what they called “finance-capitalism,” they then had to confront the problem of 
how socioeconomic structures could be changed without violent revolution and 
the loss of freedom. Unless those structures were changed, many of them believed, 
democratic education would be inconceivable. And democratic education, focused 
on the development of critical thinking and the release of human power for choice 
and action, was necessary if democracy itself was to be preserved.
For them, the “bewitchment of thought”2 that endangered democracy was 
not due mainly to conceptual or linguistic confusions. They attributed it largely 
to the perpetuation of old pieties, outmoded “individualist” views of American 
society.  The lags, the fixities of thought, were functions of a deficient status quo; 
they prevented people from redefining social goals. Centering their attention on 
the demands of an “age of collectivism,” the contributors to the Frontier showed 
no particular interest in what existentialists called the “human condition,” nor in 
“Being,” nor in the life of consciousness. They inhabited a world in which human 
intelligence, open communication, and cooperative action presumably could be 
counted upon to solve the major problems facing humankind. Differ though they 
might on political and social issues (the relevance of Marxism, the significance 
of class interest in America, the meanings of social reconstruction), they shared 
a range of fundamental commitments, many having to do with educational phi-
losophy. Philosophy, as they viewed it, was not only the “theory of education;”3   its 
function was to direct educational practice and to shape its purposes. Since edu-
cation was primarily a social enterprise of the moment for the future of society, 
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educational philosophy’s basic concerns could not but be social and political. 
Indeed, its aims ought to be identical with those of democracy.
Dewey, Childs, Kilpatrick,. Brameld, Rugg, Bode, Counts, and the oth-
ers were writing in a period of economic depression and transition, and in an 
atmosphere of precarious reforms. They were writing, too, at a time of fascist 
expansion and aggression abroad, culminating in the Second World War.  The 
journal did not last long enough for them to have to come publicly to terms with 
the bombing of Hiroshima and the threat of nuclear obliteration. Although they 
- knew about the existence of the German concentration camps, they appeared 
not to be familiar with. the Nazis’ invention of a “Final Solution,” the scientifically 
planned and executed extermination of millions of Jews. There was  an occasional 
noting of signs in the wind with regard to the misuse of industrial power; but 
most contributors did not anticipate the consequences of science’s new links to 
technical undertakings (as at Los Alamos) nor to large-scale industrial produc-
tion. Still optimistic about the scientific method and attitude and what they 
could achieve, they did not predict the domination by depersonalized technol-
ogy of almost every area of social life; nor did they imagine the phenomenon 
of what Jacques Ellul was to call “self-augmenting technique.”4
 
There is little evi-
dence that they confronted the influence of positivistic thinking and the split 
between empirical and moral considerations such thinking entailed. Moreover, 
although there were occasional comments about thought control by means of 
media, they were in no position to predict the effect television and radio would 
have on thinking as well as discourse; they could not have conceived what has 
been described as the “industrialization of the mind.”5  Perhaps most important, 
they did not (Dewey aside) see the overwhelming of a potentially “articulate 
public”6 by a mass of “job-holders and consumers,”7 including the members of 
trade unions on who so many rested their hopes. Although, in the first issue, 
Kilpatrick drew attention to the emergence of “a highly complex urban and 
industrial order” marked by “a common dependence on a far-flung productive 
and distributive mechanism,” the contributors did not appear to see the advent 
of a bureaucratized, overly “administered” society, in which the individualism 
they lamented would be replaced by large-scale corporate planning and control. 
Events of such magnitude could not but transform the ground on which 
people attempted to “do” educational philosophy; and it is difficult to believe 
that, as the new realities entered consciousness, educational philosophers 
became less and less interested in the relation between education and the cul-
ture at large. In part, it was a response to often contemptuous criticism by the 
conservative scholarly community; in part, it was a desire to “profession alize” 
and ma ke more rigorous aspects of what was called “educational foundations.” 
In any case, many members of the post-war generation of educational phi-
losophers had been trained in academic philosophy; and academic philosophy, 
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in their time, was being affected and often remade by the influence of British 
analytic philo sophy. The wide-ranging “polity” addressed by American think-
ers from Emerson to Dewey was gradually replaced by a version of what the 
British thought of as a rational community, mainly composed of university 
graduates (almost always men).
Philosophical systems were questioned; so were efforts to draw implications for 
practice from a variety of philosophical “movements.” With the major focus on clari-
fication and criticism of terminology, arguments, “slogans,” on what Israel Scheffler 
was to call “the language of education,”8 philosophers refused to speak of themselves 
as guides to classroom practice. Such discussions as D. J. O’Connor’s, differentiating 
the use of “theory” in the natural sciences from the use of the same term with regard 
to. education,9 seemed to invalidate the treatment of philosophy as “theory of edu-
cation.” In time, such thinkers as R. S. Peters, sharply distinguishing the concept 
of “education” from “schooling,”10 made it suspect to speak of education as a way of 
bringing about social reforms. (Dewey, of course, had earlier made the distinction 
between education and schooling;11 but, for him, “education” was a larger and more 
encompassing concept. It referred to the multiple efforts to transmit knowledge and 
values throughout the culture, not in the specialized atmosphere of the school alone.) 
Analytic philosophers, also, were continually reminded of the Humean insistence 
on the autonomy of the sphere of values; and fewer and fewer were inclined to draw 
conclusions about what “ought” to be from descriptions of what “was” in the social 
domain. As for the relatively few .who ventured into modern Continental philoso-
phy: the tendency was to focus on the individual’s quest for freedom, authenticity, 
and meaning, rather than on broader struggles for social change.
But, even as educational philosophers were divorcing themselves from the 
problems of public schools, a serious erosion of faith in those schools had already 
begun.  The climate for it was created by right-wing attacks on their “mediocrity” 
and distorted images of “progressivism” that filled the public prints.  The reports of 
near-illiteracy among draftees in the Second World War added to the disillusionment; 
and there was little surprise when, at the time of the Sputnik panic, a group of aca-
demic scholars assumed responsibility for curriculum reform.  The perceived role of 
the school as an agent of social reconstruction was arbitrarily replaced· by the view 
that the school’s .prime function was to contribute to national security and the sur-
passing of the USSR in scientific and engineering expertise. Cognitive “excellence” 
became the- watchword; the promotion of individual talent, the overriding goal.
In the Sixties, with the election of Lyndon B._   Johnson to the Presidency, 
there seemed (for a moment) to be a resurgence of the Frontier’s hopes and 
ideals. Responding, in part, to the Civil Rights movement and the sudden vis-
ibility of the “invisible poor,” the reforms and remedies made possible by the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act were proposed as modes of “equal-
izing,” “compensating,” instituting overdue social change. In certain respects, 
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all this represented an expression of the “liberalism” John Dewey and his col-
leagues had in mind.  The failures, the cut-offs that followed after were due, in 
part, to the heavy invest ment in the Vietnamese War; but they were also testi-
mony (as the Reverend Martin Luther King and others made clear) to the fact, 
made very explicit by The Social Frontier, that socioeconomic structures had 
themselves to be changed if liberalism was to be achieved.
The contributors to the Frontier, it must be said, ventured occasionally into 
discussions of civil liberties, but said little or nothing about the racial problem in 
America or   how it related to the work of public schools.  There was mention of “the 
Negro” on occasion, of discrimination and exclusion, of the need on the part of the 
“Negro” to call his plight to the attention of the public. (No mention was made of 
what is now called the “gender gap” and the discrimination against women that 
constituted another threat to equity.) In any case, the Frontier writers neither saw the 
treatment of excluded groups as the test of democratic education’s claims; nor did 
they anticipate the ways in which efforts to achieve equity would further erode con-
fidence in what education could achieve. Segregation and discriminatory practices 
were offensive enough. As serious was the sudden recognition that school reforms, 
even when properly subsidized, were not themselves going to insure thoroughgoing 
equality or repair the damage done by decades of exploitation and exclusion. Again, 
major structural transformations were needed; and no polity existed (nor political 
party, nor nationwide movement) ready to bring them about. Along with the anger 
and disillusionment felt by the reformers and the defenders of civil rights, there was 
a spurt of latent resentment in the face of regulations aimed at effecting school inte-
gration and improvement. Racism and self-interest became manifest everywhere as 
busing arrangements were legislated, open enrollment programs, affirmative action, 
and the like. The tension between a demand  for equality and the affirmation of per-
sonal liberty took on new forms as thousands of white parents objected to federal 
requirements that seemed to cancel out their right to self-determination. What fol-
lowed, among such groups, were well-publicized rejections of public education. 
“Free” white schools were established, to be followed by “Christian” or “funda-
mentalist” schools set up by  people intent on protecting their parochial interests 
against the incursions of integra tion and (later) “secular humanism.”
In the period of school reform and its slow disintegration, “romantic” and 
“revisionist” critiques of the public school began to appear. The Frontier writers had 
dealt with threats to the school by conservatives, business interests, and such groups 
as the American Legion.  They had dealt often enough with the difficulties involved 
in educating for growth  and free expression in a material ist, capitalist society. But 
they never regarded the schools as intentionally repressive and selective, no matter 
how responsive they sometimes became to restrictive outside forces.  The “romantics” 
saw. the imposition of worn-out middle-class values when they looked at the schools; 
they saw. teachers threat ened by the “natural”. capacities and energies of children; 
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they saw people being socialized into respectability and small-mindedness, deprived 
of significant life goals. Certain ones, libertarian and anarchist in point of view, 
provided new legitimations for “free” or private education (or for “de-schooling”). 
They objected to any kind of centralized planning and associated liberalism with 
“sort ing” and state control.  Social reconstruction, in the Frontier sense, meant 
nothing to them; more Emersonian than Deweyan, they thought changes would 
be brought about through regeneration of the Single One.
The radical “revisionists,” in their turn, came somewhat closer to the more 
radical Frontier thinkers; but they tended to apply the tools of Marxism in a different 
way and within a different frame. They saw the schools as deliberate ly stratifying 
the young in accord with the demands of industrial capitalism. The very structures 
of educational institutions, they said, were—and were meant to be—manipulative. 
Testing procedures, tracking devices, curriculum emphases: all were intended to 
keep workers’ children, immigrants, and minorities in their place; socio-economic 
hierarchies were defended and maintained. Liberalism, for them, was to be identi-
fied with capitalism; the only hope was in the teaching of socialist values within the 
schools, in some effort to found revolutionary—or reconstructive—communities.
Legitimate philosophic problems were clearly implicit in the various modes 
of critique; but there was little response from the field of educational philosophy. 
Shifts and changes in academic philosophy were required before the focus widened 
in any degree at all. Attention was still concentrated on concept analysis, ordinary 
language, speech-act theory, the logic of arguments, the “language of morals.” 
Here and there, a few educational philosophers did concept analysis with respect 
to “equality”  or “authority;”12 but little serious attempt was made to relate what 
was happening in schools (or what might happen) to desired changes in the culture 
at large. When Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions13 appeared, 
there was some effort to look at the field of educational philosophy through Kuhn’s 
constructs of paradigms and anomalies, and a certain restlessness moved some to 
wider spheres. When John Rawls’s Theory of Justice14 appeared with its rigorous 
examination of “the prime virtue of the polity,” educational philosophers began 
more frequently to apply their analytic skills in the social and political domains. 
The rising interest in moral reasoning and moral development enlisted a number 
of them, usually in the analytic—occasionally in the Deweyan—mode. 
More consequential for a return to the concern and spirit of The Social Frontier 
were ideas stemming largely from the fields of sociology, Continental philosophy, 
and curriculum theory. The idea of “constructed” social reality, developed by Alfred 
Schutz15  and expanded upon by Peter Berger and Thomas Luck-Schultzmann,16 
occasioned new interest in what Jonas Soltis now calls “sociocentric” approaches to 
knowledge,17 certain strands of which connect to Dewey’s epistemology.
By now, however, the social and sociocentric concerns being registered in 
educational philosophy have also been affected by social phenomenology, the work 
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of certain radical sociologists,18 and the critical theory developed by the Frankfurt 
School.19 An exemplary instance of a thinker grounded in phenomenology and 
Marxism, and at once to praxis, is Paulo Friere,20 who is influencing the thinking 
of many educators concerned with social transformation. Among these are such 
curriculum theorists and sociologists as Michael Apple21 and Henry Giroux,22 
neither of whom has been fully accepted by educational philosophers, old Marxists, 
or by the Brameldians who compose the Society for Educational Reconstruction. 
Even so, they have drawn variously and productively from the resources of Euro-
pean political philosophy and used these to anatomize the school in its relation to 
society. They have shed light on the school’s role in “cultural reproduction,” on the 
unequal distribution of knowledge, and on the perpetuation of “hegemony.” In 
their search for the shapes of possible “resistance,” however, they have said almost 
nothing about the reemergence of a public in the United States and nothing about 
the  importance of recapturing the realm of discourse Sheldon Wolin says has 
been taken over by the country’s conservatives.23 Most recently, and perhaps 
most relevantly, Walter Feinberg has undertaken a philosophical inquiry into the 
various dimensions of social reproduction, including an examination of the pre-
conceptions of many recent scholars who have understood education differently: 
analytic philosophers, interpretive and Marxist critics, revisionist historians.24
  Sig-
nificantly, he concludes with what constitutes an introduction to  “education and 
the self-formation of the public,” which he believes might occur under conditions of 
dialogue and “unmanipulated judgment.”  Socially oriented and committed though 
he appears to be, he has not dealt with the problematic of liberalism nor with what 
a public philosophy of education might turn out to be.
Educational philosophers now live and work at a moment when, as Dewey put 
it in The Social Frontier,25 the “letter” is destroying the “spirit” of liberalism. What 
he said about the “meaning of liberalism” at that time might well be said today. He 
was concerned about the anti-social interests of the dominant social class and about 
its uses of the dogma of laissez-faire individualism to justify a “hands-off” policy 
by government. What began, he wrote, “as a movement in the direction of greater 
liberty for expression of the energies of man and which was put forward as giving 
every individual new opportunities and new powers, has become socially oppres-
sive for the greater number of individuals.  It has almost resulted in identifying the 
power and liberty of the individual with ability to achieve economic success . . . .” 
He concluded that a “new liberalism” required radical changes in economic insti-
tutions and political arrangements so that "social control of forces and agen-
cies socially created may accrue to the liberation of all individuals associated 
together in the great undertaking of building a life that expresses and promotes 
human liberty.” Words like these in their passion are in many ways expressive of 
the commitment of The Social Frontier: a commitment to liberate and to transform. 
But, we ·must add, in the world the contributors· knew.
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For all the relationships and the live implications, educational theorists today 
are likely to constitute their social realities quite differently. They look out on a world 
of broken promises and destroyed faiths, a world where tortures continue to be the 
order of the day in both hemispheres, where totalitarian thought controls multiply, 
where wars go on eternally, where multinational corporations extend their influence 
further  and further, where the prospect of world government recedes each day. 
The vision of human societies becoming responsive to intelligence and modera-
tion dims accordingly.  Even the so-called “democracies” tolerate—and sometimes 
sponsor—brutalities and violence toward human beings.  And no one can claim 
economic or commercial success; since economic failures seem unmanageable, no 
matter what the system.  Centralized planning seems unworkable; the scale and 
cost of support networks make localism seem unthinkable. Wherever one looks, 
facts like these are obscured. The “space” of human association is dominated by 
propaganda, the artificial languages of “cost-benefit” concerns, or simple mystifi-
cation. It becomes increasingly difficult for individuals to express or to communi-
cate their own particular values, values formed—not as members of a “crowd” or 
an “audience” or a “congregation”—but as ordinary beings trying to learn how to 
live together, how to “be.”  In the background, sometimes confronted and some-
times denied, there is the ever present danger of nuclear holocaust, the possibility 
of losing what human beings have  in common: their world, their human world.
In the meantime, in our country, federal demands for educational “excellence” 
are openly linked to “national interest,” meaning economic and military primacy. 
Stress is laid on “effectiveness,” on scientific proficiency, on computer literacy. Efforts 
are deliberately made to exclude value education from the schools, as cognitive 
expertise in the fields relevant to expanding technology becomes the overriding 
norm. And the grassroots population, suffering unemployment,. dislocation, and 
anxieties related to the “high tech” society they are told is in the making, can only 
call for more and more concentration on technical skills, “competencies,” saleable 
aptitudes. Disturbing numbers of them, black and white, react to talk of “tax cred-
its” with plans to send their children to private or parochial schools.
This is but one of many indications of the contemporary “eclipse of the 
public,”26 of a feeling that the space between separate individuals is empty, a 
kind of void. Somehow that space must be recreated; somehow, we must bring 
into existence an “in-between."27 To move toward a public philosophy of educa-
tion in days like these is to work toward what was once called theoria, mean-
ing a normative conception of a rational. and humane society. It is not a matter 
of sociological description or the kind of explanatory enterprise associated 
with political science. Nevertheless, the effort ought to incorporate some of the 
“experimental” consciousness of The Social Fron.tier, avoiding doctrine and final. 
answers, keeping the goal in the realm of possibility.  And, certainly, the ques-
tions must be kept open: the questions about liberty, equality, planning, social 
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reconstruction, social control.  If education has to do with empowering persons 
for participant and articulate membership in their society, these issues have as 
much to do with education   as they do with the surrounding culture. Although 
we (like Dewey and others) cannot claim that schools have the capacity to 
“change the social order,” we can affirm a continuity between the public space 
we would like to see and what happens (or ought to happen) in public schools.
In pondering what a public philosophy of education might be today, how-
ever, we are not required to go back in time in order to recover what some believe is 
lost. The optimistic humanism, the “social consciousness” of the Frontier contribu-
tors are appealing enough to make certain readers want to set aside what has been 
learned about language and consciousness, about the problematic of empiricism, 
about technology and hegemony, and even about the insoluble nature of some of the 
problems now facing the world.  But there is no turning back. There is no undoing of 
the extermination camps or the Gulags, of the recognition that educated and intel-
ligent people can commit unimaginable crimes. There is no undoing of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, no denying of our country’s responsibility for massacres. Nor can 
there be a covering over of the assassinations in the recent past, of the extremities 
in Vietnam and Cambodia, of the “lying in public” that has marked our several 
administrations, of the moralistic masking of the truth.
Similarly, there can be no rejection of what we have learned in educational 
philosophy itself, when it comes to clarification and critical understanding.  There 
will remain differences between those who take the analytic, highly rationalist, 
often Kantian approach and those who insist on the importance of standpoint, 
perspective, and the intentionality of consciousness. But there may be widening 
areas of agreement on the matter of constructed or constituted realities, on the 
need for “communicative competence”28 and new modes of “critico-creative think-
ing”29 And, surely, when it comes to the matter of human reality, there is no denying 
today that people become “human” by means of communication and within matri-
ces of relationship.  Whether personhood is understood in the sense of centers of 
consciousness30 or in the sense of what has to be chosen, what is not  yet,31 there is 
at least some tacit acknowledgment that to be an individual depends upon being 
with others in a way that entails mutuality and regard.  It is unlikely, therefore, that 
the old “either/ors” (liberty or social control); equality or self-determination; self-
actualization or socialization) would today provoke serious philosophical debate.
As for the crucial issues of values and ethics, there remains a spectrum of 
points of view. Like the academic philosopher today, however, the educational 
philosopher tends to look outward from his/her study or institution. What is 
specifically “desirable” in educational activity still concerns him/her; so does the 
ubiquitous question of the “worthwhile.” The matter of “oughtness,” the matter of 
“norm-governed action” in the course of learning, the matter of virtue: all these 
still preoccupy the educational philosopher. However, even as philosophy in other 
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fields has become concerned with issues of justice, human rights, and social welfare, 
so has educational philosophy begun to consider related questions as they touch 
upon teaching and learning, and upon the structures of the schools.
Once a philosopher chooses to enter into the great “conversation”32 about 
freedom, equity, human rights, power, and choice, that philosopher has to some 
extent “gone public.” There remains, however, the contribution to be made to 
recreation of a public space, to the reemergence of an “articulate public” by those 
whose primary focus is on the public school. For Sheldon Wolin,33 the domination 
of public discourse by economics with its special language of “cost-benefit” and 
“rationality” makes difficult, if not impossible, the existence of a civic ethic.  The 
reason for a civic culture, he writes, “is that citizens will have to cooperate, tell 
the truth, respect each other’s rights and sensibilities, observe the law, and pay 
taxes, if a self-governing and free society is to be possible.”34 A public philosophy 
is needed to nurture such an ethic; but, when such a philosophy is grounded in 
economics, the ethic is declared. obsolete. Much in. the spirit of The Social Fron-
tier, Wolin views the anti-political power now being usurped as “generated by 
the search for private advantage;” there exists no principle for finding common 
ground. He finds conservative groups, with arguments grounded in the political 
culture of a time long past, taking over the space where significant human val-
ues are discussed. The Moral Majority, the anti-abortionists, the creationists, the 
fundamentalists: these have, he says, in their solidarity and sense of community, 
provided a substitute for politics. Doing that, “they leave the entire structure 
of power, inequality, hopelessness, and growing repression wholly untouched.’’
Whether Wolin’s sense of despair is justified  or not, whether a new public 
philosophy will “need the backing of the moral and religious conservatives” or 
not, he is surely correct in pointing to the impacts of the new economic positiv-
ism, especially as it becomes incorporated in official language and media explana-
tions. The educational philosopher, still concerned about the nurture of intelligence 
and critical thinking, may well begin to “do” a more public philosophy if he/she 
attends—and empowers others to attend—to the nature of contemporary mystifica-
tion and domestication. This not only means an understanding of how language is 
used and how it affects human consciousness; it means a deliberate effort to break 
through the impersonality and namelessness of speakers, the presumed “objectiv-
ity” that allows them to give their explanations the inexorability of natural law.
It means as well a conscious attentiveness to the actualities of lived expe-
rience in the classroom, to the common-sense realities in which sense-making 
begins. Biographies should be taken into account, and background awareness, so 
that students can be made conscious of the fact that “reality” signifies interpreted 
experience, and that interpretation is affected by location and by point of view. School- 
learning, “liberal education,” even “initiation” mean empowering persons to inter-
pret in more and more varied and complex ways, to structure their experiences with 
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the aid of patterns made available by their “predecessors and contemporaries.”35  
To know this, to recognize that understanding is a free act, undertaken by a person 
as center of consciousness, is to be somewhat defended against false consciousness. 
To be afflicted with false consciousness is to incorporate, without question, the arti-
ficial needs fabricated by advertising, to acquiesce in “commodity fetishism,”36 to 
become the object of (rather than the listener to or the beholder of) popular culture.
To empower persons in this way may be to make it possible for them to come 
together, as distinctive beings, in “speech and action,”37 in a space where freedom 
can once again come to be. To speak is to articulate and, at once, to discover what 
one thinks and how one sees. If situations can be created in which people are free to 
speak in “agent-revealing ways,” as who and not what they are (as Hannah Arendt 
puts it),38  they may be able to bring into existence an “in-between,’’ something more 
significant than a sharing of interest, something that creates a “web of relationships.” 
It is this that makes possible the institution of a public space, brought into existence 
by people in their distinctiveness and in their moral equality. Given the opportunity 
to speak from their own perspectives about what lies between, what they hold funda-
mentally in common, they may be able to recreate a civic culture, a “common world.”
If liberalism connotes (as some of the Frontier writers believed) a commit-
ment to human liberation—liberation for action and speech and choice, the spirit 
of liberalism may be given play again if a public philosophy of education develops 
a theoria oriented to a public space.  Again, there is no turning back. There is the 
need. to clarify what it signifies to engage in critique, to pursue freedom, to be with 
others.  And, in the tradition of The Social Frontier, to act in concert with others 
taking part in the ongoing conversation, to live toward· open possibility.
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